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CECL: The New Expected Credit Loss Standard a Big 
Loss for Small Banks  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Famed science fiction writer Ray Bradbury once summed up his 
personal writing style by stating that he was not “trying to predict the 
future” but rather was “trying to prevent it.”1  The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (“FASB”) sets a similar goal with its newly released 
Current Expected Credit Loss (“CECL”) accounting standards.2  Under 
CECL, FASB does not expect financial institutions to forecast the next 
economic downturn, but instead aims to adequately prepare these entities 
to prevent a major recession.3   
FASB is an independent, private sector, not-for-profit 
organization that issues financial accounting and reporting standards for 
companies and not-for-profit organizations which adhere to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”).4  In 2016, FASB sent 
shockwaves through the financial industry when it released a new 
standard for calculating credit losses.5  Credit losses are allowances that 
a lender sets aside based on the amount of a loan that is unlikely to be 
repaid.6  These losses will appear on both a bank’s income statement and 
 
 1. Michael Walsh, To Prevent the Future, N.Y. POST (June 7, 2012), 
https://nypost.com/2012/06/07/to-prevent-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/AV58-BLM2]. 
 2. See Mark Zandi & Cris deRitis, CECL Will Strengthen, Not Hinder, Financial 
System, AM. BANKER (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:25 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-will-strengthen-not-hinder-financial-system 
[https://perma.cc/JZB9-HQXW] (arguing that CECL is less procyclical than previous 
accounting standards and will thus guard against a prolonged recession by being more 
responsive to economic demands). 
 3. Id. 
 4. About the FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 
[https://perma.cc/X494-T9FL] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
 5. Tom Kimner, What is CECL?, SAS, 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/cecl-are-us-banks-ready.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y72Q-V4J3] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 6. Supervisory Policy and Guideline Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/alll.htm [https://perma.cc/6D89-
LRD7] (last updated Nov. 20, 2019). 
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balance sheet.7  On an income statement, credit losses are listed as 
expenses.8  However, on a balance sheet, credit losses serve as a contra-
asset reducing the value of recorded loans.9  
Registering credit losses provides a more accurate picture of a 
bank’s financial health because it shows how much loan revenue the bank 
actually expects to receive.10  It also gives the bank a backup source of 
funds which can be drawn from if the loan defaults.11  For example, if a 
ten percent risk accompanies a $100,000 loan, then the lender would need 
to allocate $10,000 for credit losses.12  This $10,000 would be added to 
the pool of credit loss loan reserves which can be drawn from if a loan 
defaults.13  The $10,000 would be deducted from the maximum $100,000 
in accounts receivable on the balance sheet and the net amount of $90,000 
would be recorded.14  On an income statement, this $10,000 would 
simply appear as an expense, limiting net profit.15  
Previously, FASB endorsed Financial Accounting Standard 
(“FAS”)-5 and FAS-114 for calculating credit losses.16  Both FAS-5 and 
FAS-114 required institutions to account for these losses only when they 
were “probable” to be incurred.17   As a result, credit losses were only 
noted when they were expected to be incurred within the next twelve to 
 
 7. Daniel Liberto, Allowance for Credit Losses, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/allowance-for-credit-losses.asp 
[https://perma.cc/MLW8-UCPF] (last updated Apr. 25, 2019). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See John R. Walter, Loan Loss Reserves, FED. RES. BANK OF RICH., ECON. REV., 
July/Aug. 1992, 20, 21 
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_rev
iew/1991/pdf/er770402.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QJE-J88J] (“Displaying loans on a bank’s 
balance sheet as the amount of funds lent without an adjustment for expected but uncertain 
future losses would mislead the bank’s board of directors, creditors, regulators, and investors 
by overstating the bank’s assets.”). 
 11. See Frequently Asked Questions on the New Accounting Standard on Financial 
Instruments – Credit Losses, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/faq-new-accounting-standards-on-
financial-instruments-credit-losses.htm [https://perma.cc/R3SU-QQYJ] (last updated May 
23, 2019) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions] (“In concept, an allowance will be created 
upon the origination or acquisition of a financial asset measured at amortized cost. The 
allowance will then be updated at subsequent reporting dates.”). 
 12. Walter, supra note 10, at 21. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Kimner, supra note 5. 
 17. See id. (“Under the previous incurred-loss model, banks recognized losses when they 
had reached a probable threshold of loss.”). 
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fifteen months.18  One of the primary concerns with the FAS-5 and FAS-
114 models was that organizations could not record losses that were 
forecasted but had not yet become sufficiently “probable.”19  This issue 
became especially apparent during the 2008 financial crisis when a high 
number of borrowers defaulted and banks had not adequately built up 
reserves.20  At the same time, analysts used long-term data to devalue 
institutions before they could note accounting losses.21   
In response to these concerns, FASB published its new CECL 
standards in June 2016.22  CECL requires accounting for all credit losses 
expected over the entire life of the loan, not just when losses become 
probable.23  This means that for a thirty-year mortgage, accountants must 
estimate expected future losses and set aside reserves for the entire loan 
period, regardless of whether it is paid off in thirty years or in five.24  
Since fluctuations in loan loss reserves are a strong indicator of a bank’s 
financial health,25  one of the goals of CECL is to provide regulators with 
a more accurate picture of a bank’s assets.26  CECL should also 
incentivize banks to become more risk-averse since they will need to 
 
 18. See id. (“Additionally, while current rules require an allowance for credit losses only 
expected to incur over the next 12 months, CECL removes the probable loss threshold and 
requires a lifetime credit loss allowance to be established on day one of each exposure.”). 
 19. See Credit Losses, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 
https://www.fasb.org/creditlosses&pf=true [https://perma.cc/QPA4-JLBV] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2020) (“This model has been criticized for restricting an organization’s ability to record 
credit losses that are expected, but do not yet meet the ‘probable’ threshold.”). 
 20. See id. (arguing that the global financial crisis highlighted the problems with the 
previous credit loss standards). 
 21. See id. (“In the lead-up to the financial crisis, financial statement users were making 
estimates of expected credit losses using forward-looking information and devaluing financial 
institutions before accounting losses were recognized. This highlighted that the information 
needs of users differ from what GAAP requires.”). 
 22. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11. 
 23. Kimner, supra note 5. 
 24. See Mary Ellen Biery, CECL Forecasting: How Far Into the Future is Far Enough, 
ABRIGO, https://www.alll.com/alll-insiders/cecl-far-enough/ [https://perma.cc/M92D-2RTR] 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (stating that part of the challenge for banks is calculating how long 
a loan will last). 
 25. Walter, supra note 10, at 21 (stating that calculating loan loss reserves prevents 
examiners from being misled by apparent bank assets that are unlikely to be realized). 
 26. See Dr. Dan Geller, New CECL Model, “Defaults Dynamics,” Makes Banks Too 
Smart to Fail, According to Dr. Dan Geller of Analyticom, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/new-cecl-model-defaults-dynamics-makes-
banks-too-smart-to-fail-according-to-dr-dan-geller-of-analyticom-2018-10-16 
[https://perma.cc/GN3B-77FB] (“CECL is more than just an allowance calculation – it is an 
early warning system.”). 
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account for more default risk upfront rather than later on.27  Ultimately, 
CECL aims to better equip financial institutions to prevent severe 
recessions by increasing reserves and better aligning credit losses with 
expected future income.28  
CECL applies to all banks, savings associations, credit unions, 
and financial institution holding companies that follow GAAP.29  Public 
businesses that are SEC filers were the first institutions required to 
implement this method, starting in the fiscal year beginning after 
December 15, 2019.30  Public business entities that are non-SEC filers 
must be in compliance after December 15, 2022.31  Finally, the SEC 
stated that small reporting companies, as well as non-SEC public and 
private companies, will also have until the fiscal year beginning after 
December 15, 2022 to implement the new standard.32 
Specifically, CECL requires that expected losses be calculated 
using “relevant information about past events, including historical credit 
loss experience on financial assets with similar risk characteristics, 
current conditions, and reasonable and supportable forecasts that affect 
the collectability of the remaining cash flows over the contractual term of 
the financial assets.”33  Many banks experienced trouble interpreting this 
guideline, especially regarding what constitutes “reasonable and 
supportable.”34  What is clear, however, is that the challenge associated 
with generating this data for banks will be considerable.35  
 
 27. See  Sheila Blair, Congress Should Stay Out of New Bank Rules on Loan Losses, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/f699d7e0-ad28-11e9-b3e2-4fdf846f48f5 
[https://perma.cc/3HKR-8KLN] (“[I]t should make bankers a little more cautious in their 
lending decisions, as they will have to account for likely losses when the loan is made, not 
kick the can down the road until the borrower is actually in arrears.”). 
 28. Zandi & deRitis, supra note 2 (arguing that CECL will incentivize banks to increase 
reserves during periods of growth to more adequately prepare for downfalls). 
 29. See Accounting Standards Updates – Effective Dates, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137102 
[https://perma.cc/V8AG-YDZC] (last visited Jan. 18, 2020) (“Public business entities that 
meet the definition of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filer, excluding entities 
eligible to be smaller reporting companies as defined by the SEC, for fiscal years beginning 
after December 15, 2019, including interim periods within those fiscal years. All other entities 
for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2022, including interim periods within those 
fiscal years.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Banking: Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL), ABRIGO (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45339.html [https://perma.cc/GUR9-DCC5] 
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This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II explores why CECL will 
have a major impact on the banking industry as a whole.36  Specifically, 
Part II focuses on the significant increase in loan loss reserves expected 
as a result of CECL and the challenges presented in generating data to 
support this expected income.37  Part III explains why bigger banks are 
far better equipped to invest in CECL and handle these difficult data 
requirements compared to smaller banks.38  Part IV suggests steps that 
can be taken to alleviate this disproportionate impact on smaller banks.39  
Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion, summarizing the argument as a 
whole.40 
II.  CECL WILL BE A DRAMATIC SHIFT FOR ALL BANKS 
A.  Most Banks Will Have to Greatly Increase Loan Loss Reserve 
Allocations 
One of the most notable effects of CECL will be its impact on 
bank loan loss reserve allocations.41  When credit losses are estimated, 
banks are required to set aside funds as loan loss reserves.42 These 
reserves balance out revenue lost from loan defaults, late payments, and 
renegotiations.43  When a loss occurs, banks can use the reserve funds to 
cover the loss instead of reducing income at the time of the loss.44  Many 
 
[hereinafter Banking: CECL] (“Adopting CECL may require upgrading existing hardware and 
software or paying higher fees to third-party vendors for such services.”). 
 36. See infra Part II. 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. See infra Part V. 
 41. See Kimner, supra note 5 (“Perhaps more important to the bottom line is the more 
recent publication of revolutionary changes to accounting standards that determine the 
appropriate level of balance sheet reserves for credit losses.”). 
 42. See Walter, supra note 10, at 20 (“The federal banking regulators … require that all 
banks include in their financial statements an account named allowance for loan losses …. 
The account absorbs loan losses both from loans the bank can currently identify as bad loans 
and from some apparently good loans that will later prove to be uncollectible.”). 
 43. See Julia Kagan, Loan Loss Provision, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loanlossprovision.asp [https://perma.cc/88NL-
DYSK] (“This provision is used to cover a number of factors associated with potential loan 
losses, including bad loans, customer defaults, and renegotiated terms of a loan that incur 
lower than previously estimated payments.”). 
 44. Adam Barone, Bank Reserve, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bank-reserve.asp [https://perma.cc/U53B-2Q7C] (last 
updated Jan. 29, 2020). 
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investors look to bank reserve increases as a problematic sign for banks.45  
This is because when banks increase reserves, it often signals that they 
are engaged in more risky ventures or that some of their loans have 
already defaulted.46   
However, banks generally want to minimize the amount of funds 
they have tied up in reserves.47  The more a bank increases its reserves, 
the less liquidity it has to lend and generate profits.48  The “primary 
business of banking” is to use depositors’ funds in order to lend money 
and collect interest.49  Therefore, although loan loss reserve requirements 
are an important safeguard, they also directly undermine a bank’s efforts 
to maximize income.50  
CECL now requires banks to account for all expected losses 
during the life of a loan instead of just when losses become probable.51  
Since the risk is generally estimated over a longer period of time, the 
amount of revenue that could be lost will likely increase.52  For example, 
a newly issued twenty-year fixed-rate mortgage may only have a minimal 
likelihood of loss from expected revenue over the first few years.53  This 
is because many borrowers have a certain amount of funds set aside to 
repay initial payments and have a strong sense of their immediate 
 
 45. See Nicola M. White, Citi, Chase Break For Big Boost in Loan Loss Reserves, 
BLOOMBERG TAX (May 30, 2019, 10:01 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-
accounting/citi-chase-brace-for-big-boost-in-loan-loss-reserves [https://perma.cc/K9BT-
GKP3] (stating that changes in loan loss reserves are a problematic signal for investors). 
 46. See id. (“Investors care about changes in loan loss reserves because when a bank 
shores up its reserves, it signals that trouble is brewing.”). 
 47. See Barone, supra note 44 (“[B]anks normally minimize their excess reserves and 
lend out the money to clients rather than holding it in their vaults.”). 
 48. See id. (“Banks usually have little incentive to maintain excess reserves because cash 
earns no return and can even lose value over time due to inflation.”). 
 49. Walter, supra note 10, at 20. 
 50. Barone, supra note 44. 
 51. See Kimner, supra note 5 (“[T]he calculation of the expected credit loss is now 
computed over the life of the loan.”). 
 52. Emilio Lopez & Dr. Janet Zhao, CECL Quantification: Commercial & Industrial 
(C&I) Portfolios, MOODY’S ANALYTICS (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/webinars-on-demand/2017/cecl-quantification-
commercial-industrial-portfolios [https://perma.cc/TL3C-TJHT] (“62% of banks surveyed by 
Moody’s Analytics expect CECL compliance to increase their overall provisions.”). 
 53. See Joseph Breeden, Dear Congress: Don’t Toss CECL Out, Work with FASB to 
Amend It, AM. BANKER (July 2, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dear-congress-dont-toss-cecl-out-work-with-fasb-
to-amend-it [https://perma.cc/HUP2-68X9] (“With IFRS 9, over 80% of a loan portfolio is 
allocated at a “single year” reserve amount, which is far different from that of CECL for a 30-
year mortgage.”). 
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economic outlook when they decide to borrow.54  Over the course of the 
twenty-year period, the probability of late payments or default increases 
substantially.55  This can be attributed to the larger role that 
macroeconomic trends begin to play during a longer timeframe.56  
Many top officials from the largest U.S. banks have issued 
statements supporting the notion that reserves will increase.57  Marianne 
Lake, Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) for JP Morgan, predicted that 
CECL would cause her organization to increase its reserves by $5 billion, 
a thirty-five percent increase.58  Similarly, Bank of America’s CFO, Paul 
Donofrio, stated that his company forecasted a twenty percent increase in 
reserves as a result of CECL, amounting to an extra $2 billion.59  Other 
major institutions that issued statements regarding the impact of the new 
accounting standard include Citigroup, which stated that its reserves 
would increase by twenty to thirty percent, and Discover, which said that 
it would raise reserves by fifty-five to sixty-five percent.60  
Since FASB has delayed CECL implementation for small 
institutions until late 2022, the majority of smaller, regional banks have 
declined to issue public forecasts on the expected impact of CECL.61  
However, Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc., a Nashville bank with roughly 
 
 54. See id. (arguing that short term mortgage risk is far less than risk over an extended 
period). 
 55. Lee E. Ohanian, Who Defaults on Their Mortgage, and Why? Policy Implications for 
Reducing Mortgage Default, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2017/who-defaults-on-their-mortgage-and-why-
policy-implications-for-reducing-mortgage-default [https://perma.cc/M3N5-Q5BN] (arguing 
that economic and individual factors can have a strong impact on the ability to repay 
mortgages over time). 
 56. See id. (stating that changes in the ability to pay are the primary reason for mortgage 
default). 
 57. See Brian Riley, CECL Impact to Chase: 35% Increase Raises Loss Reserves by $5 
Billion, Mostly Credit Cards, PAYMENTS J. (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.paymentsjournal.com/cecl-impact-to-chase-35-increase-raises-loss-reserves-
by-5-billion-mostly-credit-cards/ [https://perma.cc/N8ZR-9MJV] (“JP Morgan Chase chief 
financial officer Marianne Lake said the financial institution expects to have to increase 
reserves by about $5 billion, or about 35 percent, on day one of its implementation of the 
current expected credit loss standard, or CECL.”); see also White, supra note 45 (stating that 
other institutions acknowledged that their reserves will go up but did not want to comment 
until closer to the implementation date). 
 58. Riley, supra note 57. 
 59. Zach Fox, Bank of America Estimates $2B Reserves Build Due to CECL, S&P 
GLOBAL (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/UuORqonZp0bNFiI21hVtMg2 [https://perma.cc/JUN4-PZRA]. 
 60. White, supra note 45. 
 61. See id. (“Nearly all mid-size and smaller financial institutions are still mum about the 
looming impact of what is considered the biggest change to bank accounting in decades.”). 
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$25 billion in assets, stated that its loan loss reserve increase would likely 
be somewhere between twenty and sixty percent.62  Even if adjusted 
gradually over the next few years, these reserve increases represent 
another substantial cost for smaller entities that already face challenges 
as a result of increased compliance expenses.63   
Because CECL typically raises the calculated allowance for 
consumer loans but decreases it for commercial loans, some institutions 
are actually predicting a reduction in their loan loss reserves.64  Wells 
Fargo, for instance, expects its loan loss reserve allocations to be reduced 
by up to one billion dollars as a result of CECL.65  The reason for this 
difference is that commercial loans tend to extend for shorter time periods and 
carry less risk than consumer loans.66  Wells Fargo’s portfolio has a much 
larger percentage of commercial loans than other top financial institutions.67   
Wells Fargo’s situation illustrates why banks may rebalance their loan 
portfolios away from consumer loans as a result of CECL.68  With a lower loan 
loss reserve burden, commercial loans could effectively stretch the liquidity of 
banks by allowing them to issue more loans overall.69  Alternatively, if banks 
want to continue issuing the same amount of consumer loans, the burden of 
CECL compliance could be shifted to the consumer.70  Because the loan loss 
reserve requirements tend to make consumer loans less profitable for banks, 
borrowers may be forced to pay higher interest rates or settle for shorter 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Blaine Luetkemeyer, CECL Spells Trouble for Small Banks, Consumers, AM. 
BANKER (Mar. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-spells-
trouble-for-small-banks-consumers [https://perma.cc/UUZ6-HLXT] [hereinafter CECL 
Spells Trouble] (stating that CECL will be “unduly burdensome” on small banks). 
 64. See Kiah L. Haslett, Wells Fargo Feels ‘Quite Prepared’ for CECL, S&P GLOBAL 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/nticf6dmy0l4zm2ittb-ta2 [https://perma.cc/L9AM-DNPC] (“The standard 
‘tends to increase’ the calculated allowance for consumer loans and ‘tends to decrease’ the calculated 
allowance for commercial loans.”). 
 65. Carolyn Duren, Wells Fargo Estimates CECL Will Reduce Reserves up to $1B, S&P 
GLOBAL (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/lK3usZayO0ScerPRvkrOHA2 [https://perma.cc/38NU-A2JP]. 
 66. See Haslett, supra note 64 (stating that shorter term commercial loans result in lower 
default risk than longer term commercial loans). 
 67. Duren, supra note 65. 
 68. Haslett, supra note 64 (purporting that CECL could impact loan terms and pricing). 
 69. Richard D. Hitt et al., CECL Implementation Expected to Propel Loan Portfolio Sales 
in Q4 2019, ANKURA (Aug. 29, 2019), https://ankura.com/insights/cecl-implementation-
expected-to-propel-loan-portfolio-sales-in-q4-2019/ [https://perma.cc/BR4Y-9J4H] 
(“Modifying the loan mix through portfolio loan sales is an effective way to manage loan 
reserves and the potential negative impacts caused by CECL.”). 
 70. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“CECL will drive up costs and those costs 
will either be passed along to consumers or force institutions to curtail lending.”). 
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repayment periods in order to rectify the difference.71  Finally, CECL may 
greatly deter banks from issuing riskier loans in the first place because of the 
impact on loan loss reserves.72  Regardless of whether a bank increases its loan 
loss reserves or is one of the few that can reduce loan loss reserves like Wells 
Fargo, changes in loan loss reserve allocations as a result of CECL will impact 
the business of banking moving forward.73    
B.  The CECL Data Requirement Generates an Unprecedented 
Need for Information 
CECL will require a substantial adjustment to the means by 
which many institutions calculate future losses.74  Due to the extended 
life of the loan requirement, organizations must now estimate risk for far 
longer than they ever had to before.75  As a result, new factors will need 
to be considered in order to generate the reliable data required by FASB.76  
In particular, macro-level information will become more impactful on 
loss calculations than it has been in the past.77  For example, under the 
previous incurred model, systemic risk in the housing market was 
unlikely to make a large impact on default probability due to the short-
term nature of the evaluation.78  Now, however, banks must provide 
adequate weight to the probability of another financial housing crisis or 
 
 71. See Joshua Ronen, A New Accounting Rule on Loan Losses Could be Disastrous for 
the Economy, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 22, 2019, 8:16 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-new-accounting-rule-on-loan-losses-could-be-
disastrous-for-the-economy-2019-04-22 [https://perma.cc/5C5C-FLE6] (“The American 
Bankers Association …warned against some of the injurious effects of CECL: increased 
volatility of regulatory capital, the necessity of increased capital at all times, higher interest 
rates for borrowers and favoring shorter term loans over longer term ones including residential 
mortgages and student loans.”). 
 72. See Large Banks Push for a CECL Extension, ABRIGO, https://www.alll.com/alll-
regulations/fasb-cecl/large-banks-push-cecl-extension/ [https://perma.cc/KE69-MNX5] (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (arguing that “CECL may have a disproportionate impact on longer-
term assets of high risks” and could thus reduce loan availability). 
 73. See Duren, supra note 65 (stating that Wells Fargo’s reserves will experience a 
significant decrease while competitors will have to build up reserves). 
 74. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. (“[I]nputs to allowance estimation methods will need to change to properly 
implement CECL.”). 
 77. See Kimner, supra note 5 (“[M]acro-level data and risk factors will need to be 
analyzed to assess the impact of various scenarios on credit losses.”). 
 78. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11 (stating that CECL is more forward-
looking and recognizes losses even before they have defaulted). 
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other such systemic risk when generating expected future credit losses on 
mortgages.79  
Adding to the complication, relevant factors for one bank may be 
wholly irrelevant for another depending on the size and composition of 
its portfolio.80  The CECL guidelines are “intentionally non-prescriptive” 
so that institutions may customize them to fit their unique portfolios.81  
One of the key problems is that missing even a small piece of information 
can have significant implications for the whole calculation.82  In a 2019 
article for Accounting Today, Mary Ellen Biery wrote that “[c]ore 
conversions, incomplete data fields, missing data fields, and a lack of 
historical losses in a loan segment or in an institution’s portfolio can 
cause problems with running a particular CECL model or being able to 
produce a meaningful result with a particular CECL methodology.”83  
CECL’s ambiguity has become a huge cause of concern for banks.84  
Due to initial uncertainty with CECL data requirements, banks may 
greatly adjust the means by which they calculate expected future losses, even 
after implementation.85  This will likely lead to volatility in reserve allocations 
and seemingly undermines FASB’s goal of increasing balance sheet 
transparency.86  The challenge presented in estimating new data sources could 
 
 79. See id. (stating that “historical loss information” will be a key component of the new 
CECL calculation). 
 80. See Mary Ellen Biery, JP Morgan Gives First Look at CECL Impact, ACCT. TODAY 
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/jpmorgan-chase-gives-first-
look-at-cecl-impact [https://perma.cc/3QS2-TKAR] [hereinafter First Look] (arguing that 
CECL impact will be “highly variable” from institution to institution due to its varying 
influence on different types of loans). 
 81. Preparing for CECL Data Requirements, ABRIGO (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.alll.com/resource-center/cecl-data-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/6B68-
SFST]. 
 82. See id. (“Put simply, if an institution does not have the right data in an accessible 
format, scenarios and parallels can’t be performed.”). 
 83. Mary Ellen Biery, The Data Dilemma: Do Financial Institutions Have Enough Data 
for CECL?, ACCT. TODAY (June 19, 2019, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-data-dilemma-do-financial-institutions-have-
enough-data-for-cecl [https://perma.cc/27MV-B37A] [hereinafter The Data Dilemma]. 
 84. See id. (“[O]nly 43 percent of respondents expressed confidence that the data they 
have will be sufficient for CECL.”). 
 85. See Brice Luetkemeyer, Bankthink CECL: A Solution in Search of a Problem, AM. 
BANKER (July 29, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-a-solution-in-
search-of-a-problem [https://perma.cc/CC89-D8FN] [hereinafter A Solution in Search of a 
Problem] (“By requiring banks to account for the expected lifetime losses of a loan at the time 
of origination, there will eventually be shorter maturities on loans. This will result in more 
economic volatility, placing swings on the back of the consumer.”). 
 86. See id. (arguing that CECL will create volatility in loan loss reserve allocations). 
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further exacerbate this issue.87  One of the problems encountered by financial 
analysts in 2008 was determining the long-term risk of the newly popularized 
subprime securities.88  Under CECL,  banks seeking to estimate data points that 
have yet to be tested will face the same problem.89  
In order to become CECL-compliant, many banks have turned to 
third-party vendors.90  A recent survey by Abrigo indicates that most 
bankers believe their institutions will turn to outside sources in order to 
implement this new model.91  In that survey, thirty-seven percent of 
bankers said they would use the models developed by a third-party, while 
another thirty-three percent said they would rely on the third-party 
entirely.92  Only fifteen percent of respondents stated that they would rely 
solely on their own resources in order to implement CECL.93  While 
vendors are certainly a useful source for generating necessary data, this 
added cost has become a significant challenge to many banks’ profit 
margins.94  Effectively, the use of a third-party shifts the issue from being 
a data problem to a financial problem.95 
 
 87. See The Data Dilemma, supra note 83 (stating that CECL creates a variety of data 
challenges in generating reliable data). 
 88. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis, DE ECONOMIST 157, NO. 2, 2009 129, 132 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10645-009-9110-0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CF2W-EVP7] (“The IMF itself has suggested that, for at least some of these 
securities, market prices may be significantly below the expected present values of future cash 
flow and therefore, that market values may not provide the right signals “for making long-
term value-maximizing decisions.”). 
 89. See The Data Dilemma, supra note 83 (stating that estimating loan-level data presents 
a new challenge to institutions). 
 90. Most Bankers to Use 3rd-Party Vendors, ABRIGO, https://www.alll.com/alll-
regulations/fasb-cecl/cecl-survey-most-bankers-to-use-3rd-party-vendors-advisors-for-cecl/ 
[https://perma.cc/J4FB-SX9D] (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) [hereinafter 3rd-Party Vendors]. 
 91. See id. (“A majority of bankers expect their financial institutions to use third-party 
vendors or a combination of advisors and third-party vendors to help them implement the 
current expected credit loss model, or CECL, according to an informal poll released by Abrigo 
and MST.”). 
 92. See id.  (“Thirty-seven percent of those polled said they plan to use models developed 
through advisory services and third-party vendors/products, and 33 percent said they plan to 
use an external product alone. In other words, more than two-thirds of those polled will rely 
on external models rather than internally prepared models.”). 
 93. See id. (“Only 15 percent plan to rely solely on their own resources.”). 
 94. See Raj Gnanarajah, CONG. RES. SERV., R45339, BANKING: CURRENT EXPECTED 
CREDIT LOSS (CECL) at 9 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45339.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CSK2-99V3] (highlighting that banks will need to invest in third-party 
vendors as part of CECL implementation). 
 95. See id. (arguing that even though third-party vendors are useful for gathering 
information, they still represent a significant cost to institutions). 
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In sum, CECL represents far more than just a shift in the way that 
banks estimate credit losses.96  The new standard and the challenges 
associated with meeting its daunting requirements necessitate a 
fundamental alteration in how banks assess expected future risk.97  As a 
result, many banks will be forced to take on a greater financial burden by 
investing in third-party vendors.98  The success that each institution has 
in developing an accurate forecast for future risk will undoubtedly play a 
major role in the implementation of CECL and the overall economic 
health of that institution.99   
III.  SMALLER BANKS WILL BE DISPROPORTIONATELY HARMED BY CECL 
When asked about CECL in April 2019, JP Morgan’s CEO, Jamie 
Dimon, testified before the House Financial Services Committee that 
“[f]or JP Morgan, I don’t have concerns” but added that “I do think you 
should be looking at what [CECL] will do to smaller banks.”100  Dimon 
went on to state that in a time of economic crisis, “[small banks] will 
virtually have to stop lending.”101  Dimon’s comments stem from recent 
studies indicating that, had CECL been in place during the 2008 financial 
crisis, banks would have had a much harder time issuing loans due to 
CECL’s high loan loss reserve requirements.102 
Dimon’s statements should serve as a strong warning to FASB 
that CECL will not affect all banks equally.103  In particular, CECL will 
 
 96. See First Look, supra note 80 (arguing that CECL will result in major loan loss 
reserve adjustments, consequently changing the industry). 
 97. See id. (stating that CECL will result in big changes in both small and large 
institutions). 
 98. Gnanaraiah, supra note 94. 
 99. The Data Dilemma, supra note 83 (“Whether a financial institution has enough or the 
right kind of data for estimating the allowance for credit losses under CECL will really be 
determined on an institution-specific basis,’ said Paula King, Abrigo senior advisor and a 
former bank CFO and co-founder.”). 
 100. Neil Haggerty, Guns, CECL and ‘Too Big To Manage’: Big-Bank CEO’s on Hill, 
AM. BANKER (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/guns-cecl-
and-too-big-to-manage-big-bank-ceos-on-hill [https://perma.cc/SF45-2XWP]. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) Standard Will Make the Next Recession 
Worse, BANK POL’Y. INST. (July 16, 2018), https://bpi.com/analysis-demonstrates-that-the-
current-expected-credit-loss-cecl-accounting-standard-would-be-procyclical-if-used-for-
regulatory-capital-purposes/ [https://perma.cc/Z24X-C7T4] [hereinafter BANK POL’Y. INST.]. 
 103. Haggerty, supra note 100 (stating that small banks will be more adversely impacted 
than larger institutions). 
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adversely impact small banks in two main ways.104  First, CECL 
represents both a significant upfront and continuing investment that 
smaller banks may not be in a position to make.105  Second, research 
indicates that under CECL, a recession will hinder the ability of smaller 
banks to make loans more drastically than it will for larger banks.106   
A.  Large Banks Are Far More Equipped to Invest in the Cost of 
CECL Implementation 
JP Morgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo each 
have assets of over $1.89 trillion.107  In comparison, some community 
banks may only have $20 million dollars in assets.108  Even still, each of 
these vastly different entities will have to invest in the new CECL 
model.109  While the largest banks will certainly have to develop a more 
robust and thus more expensive model, smaller banks will likely feel a 
deeper impact.110  This is because, among other reasons, larger banks 
have more methods of raising capital from investors and frequently have 
higher profit margins.111  
FASB acknowledged the challenge CECL poses in developing 
systems and generating data, and responded by granting implementation 
extensions to some institutions.112  Small reporting companies and credit 
 
 104. See id. (stating that CECL will be especially harmful to smaller banks); see also 
CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“CECL will drive up costs and those costs will either 
be passed along to consumers or force institutions to curtail lending.”). 
 105. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (arguing that, for smaller banks, CECL will 
present “onerous operational challenges.”). 
 106. Haggerty, supra note 100. 
 107. Alicia Phaneuf, Here is a List of the Largest Banks in the United States by Assets, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/largest-banks-us-list 
[https://perma.cc/2UGV-CFGF]. 
 108. Rebecca Harrington, How to Start Your Own Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2016), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-to-start-your-own-ban_n_497261 
[https://perma.cc/5ZBK-B7K3]. 
 109. Kimner, supra note 5. 
 110. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (stating that smaller banks will not create 
benefits but will present major challenges). 
 111. How do Banks Raise Capital?, RAISE CAP., https://www.raise-capital.com/how-do-
banks-raise-capital/ [https://perma.cc/V4AF-7EDQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (stating that 
banks raise capital in numerous ways, such as direct investment and underwriting). 
 112. FASB Seeks Public Comment on Proposal to Delay Effective Dates for Private and 
Certain Public Companies and Organizations, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (Aug. 15, 2019), 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=1176173179331 
[https://perma.cc/N6ML-J4RR]. 
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unions will now have until January 1, 2023 to implement CECL.113  
Although this delay will give smaller entities more time to invest and 
collect data, they will still need to eventually become CECL-compliant 
and generate much more information than ever before.114     
When examining the financial impact of CECL, it is also critical 
to take into account the rising cybersecurity and compliance expenses.115  
No other industry loses more money as a result of cyberattacks than the 
financial industry.116  In 2017, banks lost a whopping $16.8 billion to 
cybercriminals.117  As a result, banks have invested heavily in 
preventative measures to avoid cybercrimes.118  JP Morgan spends about 
$600 million per year on cyber protection.119  According to a 2019 
Deloitte survey, the average cybersecurity cost per worker was $2300.120  
 
 113. FASB Issues Proposal to Delay CECL Implementation for Some Institutions, AM. 
BANKING J. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/08/fasb-issues-proposal-
to-delay-cecl-implementation-for-some-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/46J8-TBRQ] (“[T]he 
Financial Accounting Standards Board today voted to propose a delay for the implementation 
of the current expected credit loss standard until January 2023 for certain companies. The 
delay would apply to small reporting companies (as defined by the SEC), non-SEC public 
companies and private companies.”). 
 114. See FASB to Delay CECL Implementation for Some Institutions, AM. BANKING J. 
(July 17, 2019), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/07/fasb-to-delay-cecl-implementation-
for-some-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/BB6C-UNLP]  (“‘FASB’s vote to delay CECL for 
certain smaller banks offers further proof that the required efforts to implement this costly 
standard are far greater than the board has previously led bankers to believe,’ said American 
Bankers Association President and CEO Rob Nichols after the vote.”). 
 115. See Kathryn R. Edge, Bank on It: Predictions from the Bank Lady, 52 TENN. B. J. 29, 
32 (2016) (“The cost of protecting the banking system, when coupled with the cost of 
compliance and CECL, makes margins so tight that many community bankers wonder if they 
can afford to stay in business.”). 
 116. Bhakti Mirchandani, Laughing All The Way to the Bank: Cybercriminals Targeting 




 117. Id. 
 118. See id. (“Given the value that breaches destroy, financial institutions are bolstering 
cybersecurity as executives seek to mitigate the risk of cyberattack.”). 
 119. Bruce Sussman, JP Morgan Chase Cybersecurity: “We Spend Nearly $600M Per 
Year,” SECURE WORLD EXPO (July 9, 2019, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/jpmorgan-chase-cybersecurity-budget 
[https://perma.cc/3PL2-MRSA]. 
 120. Yalman Onaran, Cybersecurity Costing Large Financial Firms $3,000 Per 
Employee: Survey, INS. J. (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/05/02/525296.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LXK5-DVSM]. 
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This investment eats directly into profit margins and reduces bank 
capital.121   
Compliance is also an increasing burden, especially in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis.122  Since that time period, compliance costs 
have increased by over sixty percent for retail and corporate banks.123  
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act has cost banks an estimated $36 billion 
since its passage.124  For banks with less than $100 million in assets, 
compliance costs account for an average of 8.7% of their non-interest 
expenses per year.125  Banks in the one to ten billion dollar range spent 
2.9% of their annual non-interest expenses on compliance regulation.126   
CECL represents yet another cost hurting the profitability of 
banks.127  As previously mentioned, CECL is likely to increase the loan 
loss reserve requirements for most banks.128  In particular, banks with a 
large percentage of consumer loans in their portfolio will be impacted the 
most.129  This reserve increase removes the amount of available funds 
from banks to drive profit.130  Additionally, CECL compliance will 
require a significant investment for banks to conduct internal analysis or 
engage a third-party and pay the vendor to calculate loan loss reserves.131  
More data than ever will be required to evaluate default probability for 
 
 121. See Barone, supra note 44 (stating that banks attempt to minimize vault cash 
whenever possible in order to seek profits). 
 122. See Dilip Krishna, Regulatory Productivity: Is There an Answer to Rising Cost of 
Compliance, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/regulatory/articles/cost-of-
compliance-regulatory-productivity.html [https://perma.cc/R9JS-QK6B] (last visited Jan. 21, 
2020) (“Compared to pre-financial crisis spending levels, operating costs spent on compliance 
have increased by over 60 percent for retail and corporate banks.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Elena Mesropyan, How Banks Can Effectively Manage Regulatory Changes, MEDICI 
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://gomedici.com/how-banks-can-effectively-manage-regulatory-
changes [https://perma.cc/V83R-4DYR]. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (stating that CECL will represent a 
significant cost to banks). 
 128. Riley, supra note 57. 
 129. See Haslett, supra note 64 (stating that consumer loans “tend to increase” under 
CECL while commercial loans “tend to decrease.”). 
 130. See Bryan R. Smith, Banks Queasy about Data, Guidance as Loan Loss Change 
Arrives, BLOOMBERG TAX (Dec. 19, 2019, 4:45 AM), 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-accounting/banks-queasy-about-data-guidance-as-
loan-loss-change-arrives [https://perma.cc/5N25-XURA] (“[L]oan losses … could lower their 
earnings if they have to beef up the reserves they set aside to cover credit losses in quarterly 
reports.”). 
 131. See A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 85 (“[T]he cost of each employee’s 
time to compile information, manage third-party vendors, data feeds and modeling will be 
significant.”). 
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the life of each loan.132  Viewed as a whole, CECL compliance costs 
combined with the already substantial cybersecurity and compliance 
burdens will likely be a problem for smaller banks.133   
B.  Under CECL, Small Banks Will Have a Harder Time 
Responding to a Recession than Larger Banks 
As indicated in early studies, one of the main critiques of CECL 
is that it might fall short of its goal of being countercyclical.134  Under 
this system, CECL would increase loan loss reserves in strong economic 
times when banks issue more loans and decrease reserves in more 
turbulent periods when banks are encouraged to be risk averse.135  
However, findings show that CECL actually has the opposite effect and 
is more likely to be procyclical.136  This means that it is highly correlated 
with the economy and market risk.137  
A study conducted by the Bank Policy Institute found that if 
CECL had been in effect during the 2008 financial crisis, the recession 
would have had an even more profound impact and would have lasted 
longer.138  This finding was based on the idea that banks were unlikely to 
have built up adequate reserves prior to the collapse.139  As a result, once 
defaults started to increase, CECL would have made it tougher to lend.140  
A similar belief fueled American Bankers Association Senior Vice 
President (“SVP”) Mike Gullette’s suggestion that CECL could “prevent 
banks from lending at exactly the moment the nation would want them 
 
 132. See Smith, supra note 130 (“But while many banks have old records on hand, they 
may lack historical data covering highs and lows in an economic cycle, given how long ago 
the last recessions occurred.”). 
 133. See Edge, supra note 115, at 32 (arguing that CECL costs should be viewed in 
conjunction with other compliance obligations). 
 134. See Tony Hughes, CECL is in Trouble But There’s a Fix, AM. BANKER (Jan. 11, 2019, 
10:01 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-is-in-trouble-but-theres-a-fix 
[https://perma.cc/79V4-2QDD] (“CECL was implemented primarily to force banks to 
maintain countercyclical reserves.”). 
 135. See id. (“For true countercyclicality, proportional allowances need to be high when 
lending growth is high and low when growth is low or falling.”). 
 136. See id. (“All thorough analyses of the effect of the new rules have shown, to differing 
degrees, that allowances will continue to be procyclical after CECL comes into force during 
2020.”). 
 137. See id. (arguing that CECL is more procyclical and will build up reserves more 
dramatically in times of recession). 
 138. BANK. POL’Y. INST., supra note 102. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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lending to help the economy rise out of an economic slump.”141  Although 
more focused on small banks, this is the same problem that Dimon 
seemed to suggest.142  Gullette took his statements even further by 
entirely rejecting the notion that CECL will help prevent another 
recession and asserting that “CECL could actually make any new crisis 
even worse because of its procyclicality.”143   
The fear alluded to by Gullette and Dimon is that if banks find 
themselves in a recession without significant loan loss reserves, bailing 
themselves out could be far more difficult than in the past.144  As 
projections indicate, CECL will likely increase loan loss reserve 
requirements, and a recession greatly increases default probability.145  
When these two factors combine, banks will have diminished capital to 
make loans and will issue fewer as a result.146  This could lead to 
increased rates and more burden placed on the borrower.147  Even worse, 
fewer loan opportunities could stagnate economic recovery and lead to a 
prolonged recession.148 
Although this critical issue has the potential to harm banks of all 
sizes, CECL will particularly harm smaller banks.149  The fallout of the 
2008 crisis demonstrates that small banks are less likely to benefit from 
recession-based stimulus programs.150  Under CECL, small banks will 
 
 141. Michael L. Gullette, New Accounting Standards Are Not a Big Improvement, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bce02fce-ba9b-11e9-96bd-
8e884d3ea203 [https://perma.cc/4FWX-KNA7]. 
 142. Haggerty, supra note 100. 
 143. Gullette, supra note 141. 
 144. See id. (arguing that CECL would have made the past recession worse by making it 
more difficult to lend); see also Haggerty, supra note 100 (arguing that smaller banks would 
“virtually have to stop lending” during a recession). 
 145. Lopez & Zhao, supra note 52. 
 146. See Barone, supra note 44 (stating that when reserves increase banks have less assets 
to invest). 
 147. See A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 85 (highlighting that the many 
costs associated with CECL will be passed from the lenders to the consumers). 
 148. See Gullette, supra note 141 (purporting that CECL would have made the past 
recession worse by making it more difficult to lend); see also Haggerty, supra note 100 
(arguing that smaller banks would “virtually have to stop lending” during a recession). 
 149. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (arguing that CECL will cause significant 
harm to small banks and consumers). 
 150. Laura Layden, Banks Fell in the Great Recession, but They’re Stronger Now, USA 
TODAY (March 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/03/14/banks-fell-great-recession-but-theyre-
stronger-now/394354002/ [https://perma.cc/K8SU-ZKSK] (“About 85% of banks that failed 
in the U.S. from 2008 to 2011 were smaller ones with assets of less than $1 billion.”). 
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struggle even more than under past standards.151  This is because during 
a recession the default probability increases, and banks will need to 
increase loan loss reserves.152  As loan loss reserve requirements increase, 
more money will be tied up by issuing the same loans.153  Small banks 
will struggle far more than large banks to meet these rising capital 
demands because they do not carry the same advantages as larger 
institutions.154  
IV.  REFORM SUGGESTIONS 
Before introducing CECL reform suggestions, it is necessary to 
first establish who has the power to implement change. Since FASB is a 
private, not-for-profit organization, Congress does not have the power to 
influence FASB directly in the way it does other institutions.155  The SEC 
has been delegated the authority to dictate accounting standards for the 
private sector.156  In turn, it delegates this authority to FASB.157  Due to 
this delegation structure, the following recommendations are divided 
accordingly into: (1) suggestions for FASB, and (2) suggestions for 
Congress. 
A.  FASB Should Provide More Structured Guidelines to Calculate 
Future Risk 
Issuing more specific rules for applying CECL will help small 
banks reduce both their cost burden and procyclicality.158  In developing 
CECL, FASB sought to provide more flexibility to banks to give them 
 
 151. See Gullette, supra note 141 (arguing that CECL could make it more difficult to lend 
during a recession). 
 152. Barone, supra note 44. 
 153. See id. (stating that the higher banks reserves, the less money for investment). 
 154. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (arguing that smaller banks will be 
disproportionately harmed in times of recession). 
 155. See Banking: Current Expected Credit Loss, EVERYCRSREPORT, 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45339.html#ifn14 [https://perma.cc/7J6W-MJQP] 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2020) [hereinafter EVERYCRSREPORT] (“Congress has delegated 
authority to the bank regulators and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to 
address credit loss reserves.”). 
 156. See id. (“Currently, the SEC recognizes the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) as the designated forganization for establishing GAAP for the private sector.”); 15 
U.S.C.S. § 77s (2019). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Smith, supra note 130 (arguing that CECL’s ambiguity creates a huge challenge 
for banks). 
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the freedom to calculate the potential risks on their own.159  FASB’s only 
significant guideline was “reasonable and supportable data” to back up 
these risk assessments.160  However, the tremendous uncertainty as to 
what qualifies as “reasonable and supportable” has led many banks to 
potentially waste time and financial resources with excess information.161  
One of the primary reasons that CECL costs are so high is that the 
information is highly variable from institution to institution.162  While it 
is true that each bank portfolio is different, FASB should issue more 
structured guidance as to how each type of loan or security should be 
quantified regarding risk.163  It should also answer key questions, such as 
the way in which long-term data should be estimated for new products.164  
A more streamlined approach would aid in driving down the cost of third-
party vendors since these vendors would not be tailoring their services to 
individual banks to the same extent.165   
Another major benefit of more structured guidance is increased 
reliability of reported credit losses.166  Under the current rules, two banks 
with a similar portfolio could account for their default probability in 
dramatically different ways.167  This discrepancy creates a major risk, not 
only for the banks themselves, but also for investors who use loan loss 
reserves as a means to assess bank health.168  One of the chief purposes 
of CECL is to improve the alignment of assets and credit losses.169  The 
issuance of more concrete standards will directly aid this goal.170  
 
 159. See id. (“FASB has offered examples and a few pieces of guidance on how to make 
the calculation without issuing hard-and-fast rules on how to comply with the new 
accounting.”). 
 160. Banking: CECL, supra note 35. 
 161. See Smith, supra note 130 (“Any time an accounting standard calls for judgment, 
companies and auditors need to back up their reasoning. This puts pressure on finding reliable 
data from numerous sources and forecasts that banks can use to make what’s considered one 
of the most sensitive estimates on their balance sheets.”). 
 162. A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 85. 
 163. See Smith, supra note 130 (arguing that one of the main challenges with CECL is 
“applying an accounting standard that’s big on principles and scant on specifics”). 
 164. See id. (stating that methods for calculating long-term risk could encompass 
numerous factors). 
 165. Gnanaraiah, supra note 94. 
 166. Banking: CECL, supra note 35. 
 167. See First Look, supra note 80 (“The impact of CECL could also vary significantly 
based on each institution’s current or forecasted view of the economic environment.”). 
 168. See White, supra note 45 (“Investors care about changes in loan loss reserves because 
when a bank shores up its reserves, it signals that trouble is brewing.”). 
 169. Zandi & deRitis, supra note 2 (stating that CECL will help banks account for long 
term risk and not just that which has been incurred). 
 170. Smith, supra note 130. 
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As loan loss reserve volatility decreases, it will also help to 
mitigate the procyclical fears surrounding CECL.171  Each of the studies 
that suggested CECL could exacerbate a recession focused on the initial 
premise that banks were not adequately capitalized in the first place.172  
If structured rules were installed, all banks would follow the same basic 
system.173  Therefore, any changes to CECL would be more easily 
implemented across all banks, and systemic risk would be lessened.174  
This differs from the current CECL model, where one bank could do an 
excellent job forecasting credit losses but still suffer increasing default 
probability simply because other banks were not as successful.175  
Ultimately, this more unified banking structure would be more responsive 
to market fluctuations and thus better positioned to increase reserves 
ahead of economic downturns.176  
B.  Congress Should Provide Financial Incentives to Small Banks 
Now is finally the time for Congress to stop ignoring smaller 
banks. The costs of compliance, cybersecurity, and CECL have created a 
huge financial barrier to growing a bank.177  Each requirement carries 
very important motives.178  However, Congress should not lose sight of 
the fact that banks are businesses at their core and rely liquidity to 
generate profit.179  They also must acknowledge the dramatic size 
differences among banks and begin treating small community banks 
differently than major entities like JP Morgan and Bank of America.180  
Under our current CECL model, bank consolidations and fewer new 
banks will result in a greater concentration of power in a smaller number 
 
 171. See Hughes, supra note 134 (stating that CECL will likely be procyclical and highly 
reactive to adverse changes in the economy). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Kimner, supra note 5. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Edge, supra note 115, at 32 (arguing that the addition of CECL costs to existing 
compliance burdens represents a major challenge to banks). 
 178. See id. (stating that many of the compliance and security costs are aimed at preventing 
future harm and correcting mistakes of past recessions). 
 179. See Walter, supra note 10, at 20 (stating that collecting deposits and making loans 
are the “primary business of banking”). 
 180. Phaneuf, supra note 107. 
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of entities, which could diminish the number of community banks 
responsive to local needs.181   
One possible way of minimizing the impact of CECL is to 
provide tax write-offs to smaller banks for offsetting the cost of CECL 
data collection.182  Money allocated to future losses is not usually tax 
deductible until the debt has been charged off.183  However, a minor 
alteration could allow banks to increase capital by attaining early benefits 
for expected future losses.184  Specifically, Congress could tailor these tax 
benefits to banks under a certain asset size in order to help level the 
playing field.185  CECL serves an important role in making banks more 
responsive to financial hardship.186  A tax allowance created by the 
government could prevent future bailouts and be viewed as money saved 
down the line.187  This type of incentive could be an extremely impactful 
benefit for smaller banks struggling to turn a profit or risking forced 
consolidation.188 
Another possible incentive would be to put CECL aside and 
simply provide tax benefits to new or small banks.189  Aiding the 
institutions that are disproportionately harmed by the rising compliance, 
cybersecurity, and CECL costs will help to rectify the primary issue.190  
One possible plan would be to offer tax benefits to small banks providing 
loans in certain designated “opportunity zones.”191  Similar programs 
 
 181. CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“By requiring financial institutions to account 
for the expected lifetime losses of a loan at the time of origination, CECL threatens to 
eliminate some lending services . . . .”). 
 182. See Keith Foster, Yes, CECL Affects Taxes Too, BKD (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.bkd.com/article/2017/12/yes-cecl-affects-taxes-too [https://perma.cc/X8BH-
PLJB] (“In general, an allowance for bad debts isn’t deductible for tax purposes. The 
deduction is delayed until there’s a charge off. This means when CECL increases a GAAP 
allowance, it will increase expense and reduce capital without resulting in a corresponding 
tax deduction.”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (stating that banks are responsive to community 
needs and CECL impacts will extend to conumsers). 
 187. Foster, supra note 182. 
 188. See Tom Kimner, CECL: Are U.S. Banks Ready?, SAS,  
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/cecl-are-us-banks-ready.html 
[https://perma.cc/DH5M-3FF6] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (“Perhaps more important to the 
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Zones,’ AM. BANKER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-
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exist and serve to incentivize investing in locations facing economic 
hardship.192  This plan would be unique in that smaller banks, rather than 
all institutions, would receive this benefit.193  It would allow smaller 
banks to continue the important role of serving local communities while 
still investing in CECL.194  Preventing the closing of small banks also 
helps to maintain a more diversified banking system.195   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The new CECL accounting standards will dramatically alter the 
means by which expected credit losses are calculated.196  Banks will 
likely increase loan loss reserves and bank portfolios could shift as a 
result.197  This change also represents an enormous data challenge, and 
many banks have been forced to turn to third-party vendors for 
assistance.198  These changes will weigh far more heavily on smaller 
banks than on larger institutions.199  Large financial institutions are in a 
better position to invest in the new CECL model than smaller banks.200  
Furthermore, increased reserves are more likely to hurt small banks in 
times of recession.201  In order to alleviate data concerns, FASB should 
first look to provide more structured guidelines so that CECL 
implementation can become more efficient and cost-effective.202  The 
legislature should also explore incentives such as tax write-offs to assist 
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TODAY (November 12, 2019, 2:18 PM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/cecl-
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represents a significant change from prior GAAP, which is still used by most entities.”). 
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smaller banks.203  In conclusion, FASB’s effort to straighten out credit 
loss recognition with CECL poses an extreme risk to the future of many 
small banks.204   
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